This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1874 Excerpt: ...raw provincial levies up to an effective of seven hundred each, and, after innumerable and vexatious delays and an immense labour, were joined by independent companies from New York, Virginia, Maryland, South and North Carolina. The trouble, expense, and delay in getting the army supplied with waggons, provisions, horses, &c, was almost incredible and entirely disheartening, and it was not until about the 8th of June that the heterogeneous little command was ready to march from Cumberland. Had not Dr. Benjamin Franklin raised a large force of waggons and pack-horses in Pennsylvania, by the timely publication before alluded to, in which he frightened the German population by a threat that if they were not immediately furnished, the Hussar, Sir John St. Clair, would overrun the province and impress them, the army would not have been able to march at all. The whole force was divided into two brigades under Colonels Halket and Dunbar, numbering about 2,150 effectives, not counting the usual train of followers--women, waggoners, and hangers-on. The progress of this ill-assorted command was painfully slow, five miles being considered an excellent day's march, while most frequently it did not reach half that. Bridges had to be built, roads to be cut the whole way, deep and miry marshes to be traversed, and steep and rugged hills to be surmounted. The route chosen was by no means the shortest or the easiest one. The advice of Nemacolin, the Indian guide, was too closely followed. Frequently morasses had to be waded through and savage hills to be climbed, the heavy artillery being let down by the sailors with block and tackle. The number of waggons and pack-horses was strung out in a line of over four miles in length, which was constantly made the object of atta...