This dissertation, "Civil Service Reform in Hong Kong: New Appointment Policy" by Mei-wah, Karen, Kue, 葛美華, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: Chapter 1 Introduction I. Argument The new appointment policy which the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) adopted on 1 June 2000 to create a flexible and structured civil service framework is limited both in scope, focusing just on changing the probationary system, and in scale in revamping the existing Weberian lifetime bureaucracy down the path of New Public Management (NPM). Both the Weberian model of bureaucracy and NPM have their strength and weaknesses. To attain the optimal level of efficiency, stability and accountability in the Hong Kong civil service through the use of the most appropriate forms of employment contracts, it is argued that the Weberian long-term contracts may be combined with NPM short-term contracts such that short-term contracts are offered to new recruits and the top civil servants while the rest of the civil servants are put on long-term rolling contracts. II. Problem and Issue Prior to 1997, the public held the Hong Kong civil service in high esteem. Results of opinion polls regularly showed that the public had a high level of trust in the civil service with overall satisfaction with its performance. In February 1997, one poll found that 56.7% of the sample had trust in the Hong Kong government compared with only 25.8% in the British government and 22.2% in the Chinesegovernment (Scott, 2000, p.49). The critical role played by the civil service during the transition in sovereign change was appreciated by the Chinese and British governments and the Hong Kong public alike. However, shortly after the handover on 1 July 1997, there were completely different public views about the civil service. Public dissatisfaction with its performance was widespread and was exacerbated by the Asian economic crisis. Opinion polls found that public satisfaction with the government's performance dropped dramatically. Between June 1997 and October 1998, satisfaction with the government's performance slumped from 75.1% to 20.4%, with 35.5% neutral and 41.8% dissatisfied (Scott, 2000, p.52). The civil service at present is no less able to carry out its work than it was before July 1997 and it remains a meritocracy (Burns, 2000, Ch.l, p.l). Whether there was an actual or perceived decline in its performance will not be discussed here. But one thing is sure is that the economic downturn from late 1997 through 1999 had brought about high unemployment rate and substantial salary reduction in the private sector, widening the gap between the public and private sectors in pay and conditions of service. In particular, the suitability of continuing with the permanent terms of appointment for most of the civil servants had come under public attack after the Audit Commission unveiled several slackening cases involving junior civil servants in late 1998. Organizational failure and weak civil service accountability to the political actors and the public were said to have rooted from the permanent terms of appointment. This kind of appointment policy wascriticized for its failure to tackle post-contractual opportunism of running slack and having bred an entitlement culture in the civil service under a promised lifetime career. This dissertation focuses on the contractual relationship between the Hong Kong Government and its employees and its attempts to change the relationship in 1999. Particular focus is placed on the length of employment contracts. This dissertation argues that