Given the rise of revisionist states and recent challenges to existing alliance structures, small states now see a real possibility of having to deter their larger neighbors on their own. Some countries, specifically those in the Baltics, have established guerrilla forces and civil resistance groups as a cost-effective solution to the threat of invasion; but do predatory states understand the pain that such efforts can inflict? This project seeks to establish whether overtly prepared resistance, intended to activate after an occupation, can deter aggressors. This study examines the crises of 1968 Czechoslovakia and 1981 Poland, as well as an exploratory case of 1940s Norway. The two crisis cases use demonstrated protest potential as a stand-in for resistance capacity and to highlight functional capabilities that might clearly signal potential costs the invader would suffer. Aggressor context, if it has strategic flexibility, the proximity of some sort of sponsor, and the availability of conventional military power all factor greatly into the deterrence outcome. However, given the right recognized capabilities, like effective communication, apparent social cohesion, and demonstrable cognitive liberation, protest potential may provide a significant aid to deterrence.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Introducing the Study * A. Research Design * B. A Review of the Literature on Asymmetric Deterrence * C. Advancing Toward Resistance * II. Unseen Potential: The Prague Spring as a Deterrence Failure * A. Background * B. Strategic Context * C. Visible Cracks * D. Summary * III. Observed Hazards: Poland's Solidarity as a Deterrence Success * A. Background * B. A Distracted Aggressor * C. Building Evident Solidarity * D. Endgame * E. Summary * IV. Cold Response: Lessons From Norway's Resistance * A. Background * B. Prevailing Resistance Capacity * C. Strategic Liabilities * D. Summary * V. Conclusion: Reflection on Protest Potential as Resistance Capacity * A. Comparing The Cases * B. Unconventional Risks * C. Pillars Of An Alternative Technique * D. Areas For Further Study * E. Final ThoughtsRevisionist states, like Russia, have taken advantage of an American superpower mired in two long wars. Though the U.S. military has begun to move its focus from counterinsurgency to great power competitions, smaller nations, like Estonia and Latvia, are uncertain about United States' willingness and capability to maintain its security commitments in the face of potential Russian aggression. Even under ideal circumstances, without several more American brigades in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in the Baltics cannot expect that help would arrive in time to save them from a Russian attack, while China's increasing capabilities to counter U.S. power projection raise questions about the ability of U.S. forces to project power into the western Pacific. Furthermore, the United States' commitment to Article V of the NATO treaty has come into question. Small states, which cannot possibly sustain the military expenditures of their larger neighbors, therefore now see a real possibility of having to deter their local revisionist threats alone. As David Brin notes, "It's the losers of the last war that plan to do everything differently." In this sense, small nations like Ukraine or Georgia have lost this first round of revisionist advances; their peers were watching. Now, instead of relying entirely on conventional deterrence, some of these underdogs are playing a different game: they are openly preparing to fight after an enemy occupation.