This book discusses military deception techniques and history. "Military deception" is an umbrella term that includes both denial and deception. Denial hides the real and deception shows the fake. Denial and deception are operations; propaganda and disinformation are the products. Joint doctrine says that military deception, as applied by a joint force commander (JFC), targets an adversary's decision-making process. Ultimately, the intent is to shape the adversary's behavior in the JFC's favor or to cause an adversary to form an inaccurate impression of the battlespace. Consequently, planning for deception operations depends on intelligence and security for success. Obviously, a commander wants to conceal deception efforts from the enemy, but often he'll conceal all or some of his efforts from his own troops to prevent confusion and/or compromise of the plan. During the early years of Soviet involvement in World War II, mishandling of information by soldiers and planners resulted in the compromise of many maskirovka (or deception) operations. As a result, the Soviets implemented aggressive security measures to protect their deception plans. Specifically, Soviet commanders restricted the number of planners and documents involved in the deception operations and communicated to subordinates only what they needed to know, when they needed to know it. The general enjoyed his breakfast while reading his morning paper and listening to the international news channel. Hearing the Balkans mentioned-his area of responsibility-he looked up as a foreign correspondent began to comment on the aftermath of an Allied bombing mission from the day before. The gruesome details suddenly made the general's scrambled eggs a bit less appealing. The graphic pictures showed what appeared to be the remnants of an orphanage. There in the rubble lay a bloodstained, tattered doll. Those images left him wondering about the carnage that lay beneath the collapsed brick and mortar. Had his staff miscalculated and inadvertently struck an orphanage? A similar misstep had occurred a few weeks ago when another bombing mission resulted in civilian casualties in a marketplace. As the general bemoaned the potential ramifications of accidentally bombing an orphanage, a memory surfaced. Years of flying high-performance aircraft had sharpened his senses, and something about the scene seemed familiar. Could that be the same bloodstained doll he had seen in photographs of the earlier marketplace mishap? The general had been briefed on the enemy's rather low-tech yet successful use of deception. Was he, along with the rest of the world, a target of military deception? As he pondered this, his pager went off. This fictitious example illustrates both how easy it is to manipulate the media in deception operations and how a thorough understanding of deception can help prevent a military leader from falling victim to it. The U.S. military is transforming itself with technological advancements in warfighting capability. Weapon systems, force structure and training have all improved. The amount and kind of information available to the warfighter is also improving. But even a technologically advanced nation like the United States is susceptible to deception. Analysis of friendly and enemy deception techniques in Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE shows the main U.S. vulnerabilities to include its insatiable appetite for "news," the lack of deception-detection expertise in the military, and the tendency to believe that technological advancements make a nation deception-proof. Therefore, the key to mitigating the U.S. vulnerabilities to deception lies in educating the media about the military and common deception practices, giving the military intensive deception-detection training, and abandoning the notion that technological advancement inoculates against deception.