In the wake of Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent military support to separatists fighting in Eastern Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deployed Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to reassure NATO's members and to deter Russian aggression. The EFP suggests policy makers consider a Russian incursion into the Baltic States a significant possibility. This study explores the nature of Russia's threat to NATO's EFP. It details Russia's national security strategy, military doctrine, and foreign policy toward the Baltic States to assess Russia's political-strategic objectives. It analyzes Russia's military reforms, recent performance in Ukraine and Syria, and organization and training for combat to assess the combat potential Russia could bring to bear against NATO's EFP. The research suggests Russia is conducting information operations to achieve policy objectives in the Baltic States and does not seek to cross the threshold into open, armed conflict with NATO. The EFP presents a viable military deterrent against Russian armed aggression through its trip-wire function, which would lead to deterrence by punishment. However, the Baltic States, and thereby NATO, remain vulnerable to Russian political and social influence by way of energy dependence, malign state influence in the information sphere, and Estonia and Latvia's own divisive citizenship policies. NATO's ability to develop consensus on and codify what actions constitute an information operations attack will enhance NATO's ability to deter Russian information warfare. I. INTRODUCTION * A. BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE * B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS * C. LITERATURE REVIEW * D. POTENTIAL HYPOTHESIS * II. REASSURANCE, DETERRENCE, AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC STATES * A. THE IMPETUS FOR NATO ACTION * 1. Covert Invasion and Annexation of Crimea * 2. Russian-Backed Separatist Campaign in the Donbas * B. NATO RESPONSE * 1. NATO's Readiness Action Plan and the European Reassurance Initiative * 2. Enhanced Forward Presence * III. RUSSIAN POLICY AND STRATEGY * A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY * B. MILITARY DOCTRINE * C. RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC STATES * 1. Pre-Soviet Relations * 2. Post-Soviet Relations * D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC STATES * 1. Concept and Aims of Hybrid Warfare * 2. Russia's Hybrid Warfare Goals and Methods in the Baltic States * 3. Susceptibility of the Baltic States to Russian Hybrid Tactics * IV. RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY * A. REFORMS * 1. Serdyukov, Makarov, and the New Look * 2. Shoigu * 3. Organizational Reforms * 4. Material Reforms * B. CONTEMPORARY PERFORMANCE * 1. Ukraine * 2. Syria * C. GROUND FORCE CAPABILITY * 1. Western Military District Composition and Disposition * 2. The Battalion Tactical Group and its Organization and Equipment * 3. Training in the Western Military District * V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS * A. PERSONNEL * B. LOGISTICS * 1. GPV * C. FORCE GENERATION AND DEPLOYMENT * D. OPPORTUNITIES * VI. CONCLUSION