This thesis is about the procreative moral responsibilities of prospective parents that
intend to conceive, and the role of a parental virtue approach in encouraging
prospective parents to discharge these procreative responsibilities to their future
child without legal enforcement, or policing preconception and pregnancy.
Following an introduction, Chapter One considers if procreative moral
responsibilities exist, and if so, what they are. It identifies and explores key examples
of procreative moral responsibilities. It addresses who has them, when, and why. It
tackles the significance of the behaviour and character of prospective parents both
before conception and during pregnancy. It considers the significance of the
intention to conceive and the proximity to conception in terms of relevant capacity
(fertility) and behaviour. It examines why the choice to continue a pregnancy to
term and the choice to conceive both create procreative moral responsibilities, and
the relevance of an account of parental virtue in this context. It explains why
prospective parents that intend to conceive have procreative moral responsibilities to
their future child that begin before conception.
Chapter Two addresses whether the procreative moral responsibilities of prospective
parents are currently legally enforceable (in England and Wales) and whether they
should be. It explains what enforcement means, and argues that enforcement is not
currently within the role of the law or state. As legal change is possible, it argues that
enforcement should not be within the role of the law for ethical, legal and societal
reasons. Furthermore, it suggests that procreative moral responsibilities could not be
enforced, because enforcement via surveillance, intervention or sanctions is
impractical. Finally, the practical reasons against enforcement suggest that these
responsibilities are unenforceable.
