This thesis examines the question of language in liberal regimes. It begins with challenging two assumptions that seem to be wide-spread in liberal scholarship. The first regards the nature of language and the intrinsic value of particular languages. While many scholars view language as a tool of communication only, I argue that language is a constitutive element of personal identity and therefore has intrinsic, and not only instrumental, value. The second assumption regards the moral importance of groups and the idea of group rights. Here, too, I challenge the liberal view that tends to ignore the existence, or undermine the importance, of intermediate groups between the individual and the state, and call for the recognition of the importance of such groups and, correspondingly, the recognition of a concept of group rights. Drawing on theories of self-determination, I argue that the state is an important institution through which group rights are realized and examine the various ways in which the group right to language is realized through the state. The thesis presents two alternative justifications for recognizing non-instrumental group language rights. The first justification, which draws on theories of self-determination, is based on a paradigm of distributive justice. The second justification is based on the notion of recognition and the concept of human dignity. I argue that since language is a constitutive element of identity and an expression of human personality, the state's duty to respect linguistic minorities can also be justified under a concept of dignity. The thesis then examines the manifestation of controversies revolving around language in two countries, the United States and Israel, and the applicability of each of the two justifications I presented to these two countries.