Perception is basic for human knowledge and a major concern of both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The scholarship in this area, however, has left two important aspects of perception underexplored: its relevance to understanding a priori knowledge--traditionally conceived as independent of perception--and its role in human action. This book provides a full-scale account of perception, a theory of the a priori, and an account of how perception guides action. In exploring perception and action, it clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning, the notion of rational action, and the relation between knowledge of the practical (of how things are done) and practical knowledge (knowing how to do things). In the first part of the book, Robert Audi lays out a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects. He argues that perception is a discriminative response to its objects; it embodies phenomenally distinctive elements; and it yields rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. Audi's theory is perceptualist in that it explicates the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory also unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable causal connections with their objects--connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge. The final part explores how perception guides action, the role of propositional knowledge in our abilities to do what we know how to do, the nature of reasons for action, the role of inference in determining it, and the overall conditions for its rationality. Addressing longstanding questions left unaddressed in the current literature, Audi's comprehensive theory of perception will appeal to scholars and students interested in philosophy of perception, mind, and epistemology.

Table of Contents:
Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Part One: Perception Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World I. Perception Broadly Conceived II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception III. The Representational Character of Perception Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian Propositions III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels V. Is Perception Theory-Laden? VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification I. Perceptual Knowledge II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy IV. Reasons as Explanations V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification I. Epistemological Internalism II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification? III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification V. The Disjunctivist Challenge VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief VII. Perception and Singular Reference Part Two: Perception and the A Priori Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension I. Perception and Intuition II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional Discourse III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori I. The Concept of Self-Evidence II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident III. Understanding and Imagination IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification VI. Comprehensional Adequacy VII. Obstacles to Comprehension Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity I. Self-Evidence and Provability II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident? III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities V. Apriority and Necessity Part Three: Practical Knowledge Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action I. Belief and Action II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action I. Inference and Inferential Belief II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation III. Reasoning and Rational Action IV. The Scope of Rational Action V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action References Index