Self-deception and wilful ignorance each involve professed attitudes involving ignorance
which, in the circumstances, are difficult for others to believe. Some recent philosophical
discourse considers whether they are the same or similar phenomena, with conflicting results.
A clarification of issues, including identifying some conditions conducive to comparison of
these phenomena, such as I present here, is aimed at contributing to this debate.
Comparison of two phenomena requires a clear concept of each. A review of the literature
showed that this is not available for self-deception. Various incompatible theories have been
proposed to explain self-deception. In these theories, argument often seeks to derive sufficient
conditions from paradigm examples. Theory has reached an impasse between the two leading
theories in Analytical Philosophy: Intentionalism and Motivationalism. The first task, then, is
to identify the theory of self-deception to be used for comparison.
Paradigm examples can also be useful as tools of analysis. This is what I have done here, with
the aim of discovering the currently established theory of self-deception with the most
explanatory power. Analysing some standard paradigm examples for distinctive features of
self-deception, I have derived several 'desiderata' that a theory must address. I have added two
questions, regarding the reasons for and purpose of self-deception.
