Struggles with Coalition Warfare (Paperback) | Released: 23 May 2018

The phrase "Grand Alliance" has a poetic feel to it. The implication is of majesty and splendor. Coalition is another word for it. The goal for a union of nations is to work as one to defeat a common enemy. As it turned out, coalition unity during World War II was an exercise in survival. Political and military leaders were at the center of the struggle to remain loyal to fighting as one. Instead of directing all energies to the elimination of a hostile actor, these individuals allowed nationalism and self-serving interests to dominated strategic and tactical decisions. The buildup of resources for the European Theater of Operations in the UK for a cross-Channel invasion was completed in early 1944. Operation NEPTUNE was launched on 6 June of that year. Following the triumph on the Normandy beaches, a breakout from the D-Day lodgment succeeded beyond expectations. Unfortunately, the failure to close the Falaise-Argentan gap to trap escaping Germans coupled with the doomed plan to cross the Rhine River at Arnhem, the Allies were challenged to remain committed to the principles of coalition warfare. The British, although fully engaged in pursuit to defeat the Axis Powers, restoring their Empire to prewar status was a paramount consideration in the prosecution of the war. The Americans just wanted to end the global conflict and go home. This divergence in strategy could not be reconciled for the "greater good". Intelligent sources painted an ominous picture for the decision makers during the lead-up to the launch of Operation MARKET-GARDEN. General Eisenhower approved the plan of Field Marshal Montgomery without restrictions. Why did Montgomery ignore intelligence reports? Why did Eisenhower, knowing the gravity of the supply problem, refused to insist Montgomery carry out his order to open the Scheldt estuary to Allied sea traffic immediately? These are questions worthy of examination. MARKET-GARDEN did not achieve the outcome promised by Montgomery. The operation should be evaluated by the human cost of a hastily planned operation for political reasons and the arrogance of its leader. There were over 17,000 casualties to Allied forces during the ten days of the operation. The Dutch civilian victims exceeded 10,000. German losses ranged from 7,500 to 10,000. How do you justify tens of thousands of casualties for a few bridges, a land grab crisscrossed by rivers and canals, marshes that dotted the landscape, and roads built on dikes? World War II was the last of the great wars to recognize casualties as a grave consequence to achieve the "greater good" for humanity. The citizens of the victors accepted the loss of husbands, fathers, sons, brothers, and friends as a justifiable cost to defeat an enemy determined to destroy their way of life. It was patriotism of the first order. The members of Tom Brokaw's "Greatest Generation" did not question political leaders. They believed their president was acting to preserve all that is good about America.