When faced with any type of irregular warfare, technology integration has proved to be problematic for developed countries with technologically advanced militaries. Developed countries train and equip their militaries and develop military doctrines that tend to focus on protection from other developed countries. Thus, these military agencies are well prepared for conventional warfare and assume they can use the same operational concepts against irregular adversaries as well. Unfortunately, this theory has proved incorrect. History suggests that developed countries rely on the most advanced technologies to provide an advantage in all operations; however, high-tech does not always equate to right-tech. Through three related case studies, this thesis analyzes how strong actors use varying levels of technology to engage weak actors in irregular warfare, and how the misuse of technology can lead to defeat rather than victory for the "strong" actors. It is suggested that advanced militaries should develop technology strategies for irregular warfare that are based on tailored capabilities. Additionally, these agencies need processes that promote tactical and technological innovation to fill operational gaps in their capabilities for waging irregular warfare. CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION * A. TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY * B. SHIFTING STRATEGY * C. RESEARCH QUESTION * D. LITERATURE REVIEW * 1. Irregular Warfare and Technology * 2. Defining Irregular Warfare * 3. Technology Theory * 4. The Environment Matters * CHAPTER II - APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY * A. HYPOTHESIS * B. DEFINING THE LEVELS OF TECHNOLOGY * C. RESEARCH DESIGN * 1. Mission Type * 2. Mission Flexibility, Environment, and Required Support * D. THESIS OVERVIEW * CHAPTER III - IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY IN THE THIRD BRITISH ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR * A. END OF THE SECOND ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR * B. GOING TO WAR * C. DOCTRINE LIMITING RIGHT-TECH * 1. Artillery Doctrine * 2. Aviation Doctrine * D. TECHNOLOGY USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD * 1. Artillery Technology * 2. Aircraft Technology. * 3. Military Operational Integration * E. TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION EVALUATION * CHAPTER IV - IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY IN THE SOVIET UNION'S AFGHAN WAR * A. THE SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONSHIP * B. GOING TO WAR * C. DOCTRINE LIMITING RIGHT-TECH * D. TECHNOLOGY USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD * 1. Artillery Technology * 2. Aircraft Technology * 3. Military Operational Integration * E. TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION EVALUATION * CHAPTER V - IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY IN THE UNITED STATES-AFGHAN WAR * A. AFGHANISTAN, THE TALIBAN, AND AL QAEDA * B. GOING TO WAR * C. DOCTRINE LIMITING RIGHT-TECH * D. TECHNOLOGY USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD * 1. Artillery Technology * 2. Aircraft Technology * 3. Military Operational Integration * E. TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION EVALUATION * CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSION * A. CHANGES TO DOCTRINE * B. CHANGES IN PROCESSES * 1. Change in Resource Allocation Processes * 2. Change in Tactical Analysis Processes * 3. Change in the Acquisitions Processes * C. SUMMARY