Anybody concerned about the maintenance of peace in our world, and in prospects of reaching agreements on arms control and disarmament, is bound to be interested in one of the key pre-conditions for related international treaties: the verification of compliance with such treaties. This book presents an up-to-date exposition of the latest developments in science and practice of international verification. It contains an account of the experience with new practical results of scientific research, devoted to solving verification problems in areas where agreements have not yet been concluded. The authors are scientists and practitioners from governments and research institutes in East and West. This book is required reading for anybody interested in the field: especially for decision-makers, government and military experts, natural scientists, technologists, those working in political and historical science. Among the topics covered are: INF Treaty, nuclear test ban, control of mobile missiles, and fissile material, demilitarization of space, stability and reductions of conventional forces, ban on chemical weapons. From the Reviews: "Verfication of Arms Reductions is packed with information and analysis which is vital for arms-control students, negotiators and other practitioners. The strength of the book lies in the science and technology contributions, but there are comprehensive political analyses also which have been written for longevity and are unlikely to become dated too quickly."

Table of Contents:
I Role of Verification and Recent Experience.- 1. Transforming the East-West Conflict: The Crucial Role of Verification.- 1.1 Introduction.- 1.2 Arms Control and Verification: Some Conceptual Thoughts.- 1.3 Verification and the Political Debate.- 1.4 Towards Cooperative Security 5.- 1.5 The Role of Verification in the Process of Cooperative Security.- 1.6 Methods of Verification.- 1.7 Technology and Verification.- 1.8 Conclusions.- 1.9 Notes and References.- 2. Experience with INF Treaty Verification and Prospects for Effective Verification of Strategic Arms Reductions.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The INF Verification Regime.- 2.2.1 The Overall Concept.- 2.2.2 The Details.- 2.2.3 Implementation.- 2.3 Status of Treaty Implementation.- 2.3.1 The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA).- 2.3.2 The Inspection Process 24.- 2.3.3 The Special Verification Commission (SVC).- 2.4 Verification Problems in Strategic Arms Reductions.- 2.5 Concluding Remarks.- 2.6 Notes.- 3. Experience with INF Treaty Verification and Prospects for the Future.- 3.1 Verification and Arms Control.- 3.2 Verification of the INF Treaty.- 3.3 Future Prospects of Verification.- 4. Mechanisms for Raising and Resolving Compliance Issues.- 4.1 Compliance Problems.- 4.2 Possible New Compliance Mechanisms.- 4.3 A Supranational Arbitration Agency.- 4.4 Notes and References.- II Verification of Mobile Missiles, Nuclear Warheads and Fissile Material.- 5. Verification of Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 SLCMs and Arms Control.- 5.3 SLCM Verification Problems.- 5.4 Verification Approaches.- 5.4.1 Maximal Inspection.- 5.4.2 Minimal Inspection.- 5.4.3 Intermediate Inspection.- 5.5 Conclusion.- 5.6 Notes and References.- 6. Passive Detection of Nuclear Warheads.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 Weapon models.- 6.3 Passive Detection.- 6.3.1 Neutrons.- 6.3.2 Photons.- 6.4 Radiation Detection.- 6.5 Accuracy of Detection Analysis.- 6.6 Evading Passive Detection.- 6.7 Notes and References.- 7. Disposal of Fissile Material from Nuclear Weapons.- 7.1 Introduction.- 7.2 How to Achieve Nuclear Disarmament?.- 7.3 Recycling Plutonium in Nuclear Reactors.- 7.4 Molten Salt Reactors (MSR).- 7.5 How to Burn Nuclear Weapons?.- 7.6 Proliferation Advantages of MSR.- 7.7 Cost of Destroying Nuclear Weapons.- 7.8 Conclusion.- 7.9 Notes and References.- 8. The IAEA's Controls on Fissile Material: Limits and Successes.- 8.1 The Aim of Safeguards: Verification, not Control.- 8.2 Inherent Constraints in a World of Nation States.- 8.3 Incomplete Coverage.- 8.4 Other Limitations.- 8.5 How Safeguards Work.- 8.6 The Size of the Operation.- 8.7 How Effective are IAEA Safeguards?.- 8.8 What Have IAEA Safeguards Achieved?.- 8.9 Risks and Opportunities for IAEA Safeguards.- 8.10 Notes and References.- III Verification of a Nuclear Test Ban.- 9. Can Nuclear Weapons Be Developed Without Full Testing?.- 9.1 Pure Fission Weapons.- 9.2 Boosted Fission Weapons.- 9.3 Thermonuclear Weapons.- 9.4 "Third Generation" Nuclear Weapons.- 9.5 Notes and References.- 10. Recent Developments and Outlook for the Verification of a Nuclear Test Ban.- 10.1 Introduction.- 10.2 Recent Developments.- 10.2.1 The Joint Verification Experiment.- 10.2.2 Controversy over CORRTEX.- 10.2.3 Non-Governmental Verification Developments.- 10.2.4 The Ad-Hoc Group of Seismic Experts at the UN Conference on Disarmament.- 10.2.5 Expenditure on Test-Ban Verification Research.- 10.3 The Office of Technology Assessment Report and its Implications.- 10.4 Prospects for Test Ban Verification.- 10.5 Summary and Conclusions.- 10.6 Notes and References.- 11. UK-USSR and US-USSR Joint Research Programmes in Seismic Verification.- 11.1 Introduction.- 11.2 USA-USSR Programmes.- 11.3 UK-USSR Programmes.- 11.4 Preliminary Analyses of BSVRP Data.- 11.5 Future Developments.- 11.6 Notes and References.- IV Control of Space Weapons.- 12. Recent Developments in Space Weapons.- 12.1 Introduction.- 12.2 Recent Changes in the SDI Program.- 12.3 A New Political Strategy for Star Wars.- 12.4 Star Wars and the ABM Treaty.- 12.5 Anti-Satellite Weapons.- 12.6 Future Prospects.- 13. Verification of a Ban on Space Weapons.- 13.1 Introduction.- 13.2 Components to be Verified.- 13.3 Parameters.- 13.4 Ban on Nuclear Power in Orbits.- 13.5 Notes and References.- V Conventional Stability in Europe.- 14. Concepts of Conventional Stability and Reductions of Arms in Europe.- 14.1 Principles of Conventional Stability.- 14.2 Objects and Difficulties of Negotiations.- 14.3 Stability-Oriented Reductions of Armed Forces in Europe.- 15. Enhancing Conventional Stability in Europe.- 15.1 Introduction.- 15.2 Specific Features of a Conventional Stability Regime.- 15.3 Other Measures.- 15.4 Notes and References.- VI Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Europe.- 16. Verification of Confidence and Security Building Measures: Evolution and Future Prospects.- 16.1 Evolution of CSBMs.- 16.2 The Helsinki Regime.- 16.3 The Stockholm Regime.- 16.4 Future Prospects.- 16.5 Notes and References.- 17. Observations of Military Exercises and On-Site Inspections in Europe.- 17.1 Introduction.- 17.2 The Stockholm Document.- 17.3 NATO Exercises.- 17.4 Need for Extending of CSBMs.- 17.5 Notes and References.- VII Verification of Conventional Force Reductions.- 18. Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe: A Verification Model.- 18.1 Introduction.- 18.2 Verification and the European Scenario.- 18.3 Verification Methods.- 18.3.1 Space-Based Sensors.- 18.3.2 Airborne Sensors.- 18.4 Coverage Problem.- 18.4.1 Types of Areas.- 18.4.2 Complementary Verification Methods.- 18.4.3 Treaty Effectiveness.- 18.5 Conclusions.- 19. Aspects of the Verification of Conventional Arms Control Measures in Europe.- 19.1 Introduction.- 19.2 What is the Real Problem of Verification?.- 19.3 The Envelope Scheme.- 19.4 Tags.- 19.5 Conclusion.- 19.6 Notes and References.- 20. The Verification of Conventional Disarmament Treaties by Remote Sensing.- 20.1 Introduction.- 20.2 Visible light- and near infrared imaging.- 20.2.1 Optics and field of view.- 20.2.2 Sensors.- 20.3 Sensing with Thermal Infrared.- 20.4 Synthetic Aperture Radar.- 20.5 Airborne or Space-Based Remote Sensing?.- 20.6 Possible Verification Tasks.- 20.7 Weather Conditions in Germany.- 20.8 Data Processing and Data Integration.- 20.9 Concluding Remarks.- 20.10 Notes and References.- 21. Verification Techniques for Heavy Land Vehicles Using Short-Range Sensors.- 21.1 Context.- 21.1.1 Geographical and Numerical Limits in Europe.- 21.1.2 Verification Methods.- 21.2 Sensors for Very Short Distances.- 21.3 Sensors for Near Distances.- 21.4 General Problems.- 21.5 Conclusion.- 21.6 Notes and References.- VIII Verification of a Chemical Weapons Ban.- 22. Challenge Inspections in a Chemical Weapons Convention.- 22.1 Introduction.- 22.2 Mandatory Character.- 22.3 Equal Rights, Equal Application.- 22.4 Avoiding the Use for Other Purposes.- 22.5 The Position of the USSR 199.- 22.6 Notes and References.- 23. Verification Procedures for a Chemical Weapons Treaty.- 23.1 Introduction.- 23.2 The Likely Form of the Projected Chemical Weapons Treaty.- 23.3 The Verification System Now Envisaged.- 23.4 Notes and References.- Contributors.- Abbreviations.