Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.

Table of Contents:
Preface and Acknowledgments ix General Introduction and Outline of the Book 1 References 14 PART 1. WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? 19 Chapter 1: Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? by Jean-Charles Rochet 21 1.1 Introduction 21 1.2 The Sources of Banking Fragility 23 1.3 The Lender of Last Resort 24 1.4 Deposit Insurance and Solvency Regulations 27 1.5 Lessons from Recent Crises 28 1.6 The Future of Banking Supervision 30 References 33 PART 2. THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 35 Chapter 2: Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? by Jean-Charles Rochet and Xavier Vives 37 2.1 Introduction 37 2.2 The Model 41 2.3 Runs and Solvency 44 2.4 Equilibrium of the Investors' Game 47 2.5 Coordination Failure and Prudential Regulation 53 2.6 Coordination Failure and LLR Policy 55 2.7 Endogenizing the Liability Structure and Crisis Resolution 58 2.8 An International LLR 63 2.9 Concluding Remarks 66 References 67 Chapter 3: The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First-Century Approach by Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 71 3.1 Introduction 71 3.2 The Model 75 3.3 Efficient Supervision: Detection and Closure of Insolvent Banks 81 3.4 Efficient Closure 85 3.5 Central Bank Lending 89 3.6 Efficient Allocation in the Presence of Gambling for Resurrection 95 3.7 Policy Implications and Conclusions 97 3.8 Appendix 98 References 101 PART 3. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMIC RISK 103 Chapter 4: Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Supervision by Jean-Charles Rochet 105 4.1 Introduction 105 4.2 A Brief Survey of the Literature 106 4.3 A Simple Model of Prudential Regulation without Macroeconomic Shocks 108 4.4 How to Deal with Macroeconomic Shocks? 112 4.5 Is Market Discipline Useful? 118 4.6 Policy Recommendations for Macroprudential Regulation 121 References 123 Chapter 5: Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 126 5.1 Benchmark: No Interbank Lending 132 5.2 Date-0 Monitoring and Optimal Interbank Loans 139 5.3 Date-1 Monitoring, Too Big to Fail, and Bank Failure Propagations 148 5.4 Conclusion 153 5.5 Appendix: Solution of Program (P) 155 References 157 Chapter 6: Controlling Risk in Payment Systems by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 159 6.1 Taxonomy of Payment Systems 161 6.2 Three Illustrations 166 6.3 An Economic Approach to Payment Systems 173 6.4 Centralization versus Decentralization 181 6.5 An Analytical Framework 184 6.6 Conclusion 191 References 192 Chapter 7: Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and the Central Bank by Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 195 7.1 The Model 199 7.2 Pure Coordination Problems 205 7.3 Resiliency and Market Discipline in the Interbank System 207 7.4 Closure-Triggered Contagion Risk 210 7.5 Too-Big-to-Fail and Money Center Banks 213 7.6 Discussions and Conclusions 215 7.7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7.1 217 References 222 PART 4. SOLVENCY REGULATIONS 225 Chapter 8: Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks by Jean-Charles Rochet 227 8.1 Introduction 227 8.2 The Model 230 8.3 The Behavior of Banks in the Complete Markets Setup 231 8.4 The Portfolio Model 238 8.5 The Behavior of Banks in the Portfolio Model without Capital Requirements 240 8.6 Introducing Capital Requirements into the Portfolio Model 244 8.7 Introducing Limited Liability into the Portfolio Model 246 8.8 Conclusion 249 8.9 Appendix 250 8.10 An Example of an Increase in the Default Probability Consecutive to the Adoption of the Capital Requirement 256 References 257 Chapter 9: Rebalancing the Three Pillars of Basel II by Jean-Charles Rochet 258 9.1 Introduction 258 9.2 The Three Pillars in the Academic Literature 259 9.3 A Formal Model 260 9.4 Justifying the Minimum Capital Ratio 266 9.5 Market Discipline and Subordinated Debt 268 9.6 Market Discipline and Supervisory Action 269 9.7 Conclusion 272 9.8 Mathematical Appendix 274 References 277 Chapter 10: The Three Pillars of Basel II: Optimizing the Mix by Jean-Paul Decamps, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Benoit Roger 281 10.1 Introduction 281 10.2 Related Literature 284 10.3 The Model 287 10.4 The Justification of Solvency Requirements 292 10.5 Market Discipline 294 10.6 Supervisory Action 298 10.7 Concluding Remarks 302 10.8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9.2 303 10.9 Appendix: Optimal Recapitalization by Public Funds Is Infinitesimal (Liquidity Assistance) 303 10.10 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9.3 304 References 305