This publication by the Strategic Studies Institute offers a fresh look at the campaign in Europe. Since the end of World War II, there has been a stream of publications about the War in Europe, but despite the volume of literature, interest in the topic remains high. It begins with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then moves to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. The authors then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following the background provided in these initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was carried out. The authors, Dr. Samuel J. Newland and Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun, conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. Conversely, in the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparisons sake, an appendix is included that covers German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s. As a bonus, this ebook includes the 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. Chapter 1 - The European Campaign: Origins * Chapter 2 - Was Europe First? * Chapter 3 - 1943: Frustrations and Successes * Chapter 4 - D-Day: Planning and Execution * Chapter 5 - Toward the German Border: Operations COBRA, The Falaise Pocket, and Operation ANVIL * Chapter 6 - Operation MARKET GARDEN * Chapter 7 - The Hurtgen Campaign * Chapter 8 - The Ardennes Offensive * Chapter 9 - The Ruhr or Berlin * Chapter 10 - Conclusions and Observations As the world is moving rapidly into the 21st century, some might ask, why another history and analysis of World War Il's European Campaign? After all, historians have continuously studied the war and the European Campaign since it ended in 1945. Why should one look back to a time and conflict from the industrial age when terrorism and insurgency are so prevalent today? These questions become increasingly relevant if contemporary military challenges are considered. In particular, during the last 2 decades, America's wars have been limited to short wars against second-rate powers, failed states and, most recently, insurgencies. Since 1945, there has not been another World War II-type conflict. U.S. military forces developed war plans, trained, and designed equipment for such a situation for decades during the Cold War and continuing up to today, but we have never used them. The only wars this nation has waged since 1945 have been conflicts against regional powers that had global implications, but are nowhere near the magnitude of the events of 1941 to 1945. These recent conflicts are hardly comparable to World War II in terms of the scope, stakes, and demands placed on the U.S. military, the economy, and the population. Thus, does yet another study on World War II have any relevance, or is it merely an interesting "fun" read for history buffs or students of past military operations? The authors contend that despite the passage of time and the absence of major worldwide conflicts comparable to World War II, additional studies of this momentous war still have relevance, particularly to a student of military affairs and strategy.