Based primarily on the authors' personal experiences, this is the first study to reveal the inside story of how arms control decisions were made in the former Soviet Union. Savel'yev and General-Lieutenant Detinov participated directly in the decision-making process from 1969, when the Big Five was established, to the end of 1991, when the USSR was dissolved. They pay special attention to activities of the Politburo Commission for the Supervision of the Negotiations--the Big Five--and its working body, the interagency group known as the Five. They describe the key moments and main changes in the Soviet positions at SALT-I, SALT-II, INF, START, and DST.
About the Author:
ALEKSANDR' G. SAVEL'YEV is vice president of the independent Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies in Moscow. Savel'yev participated in the Soviet-American Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva as an advisor to the Soviet delegation and as a representative of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He is the author of a number of scholarly works on strategic and security issues and a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London.
NIKOLAY N. DETINOV, during the period from the end of the 1960s until the early 1990s, was among a handful of individuals actively involved in crafting the Soviet position for arms control negotiations. He was one of a small group which evolved into the Big Five. He oversaw the creation of its decision-making mechanisms and participated in its day-to-day operations. He participated in the Vladivostok Summit between Brezhnev and Ford (1974), the Helsinki Conference (1976) and the Soviet American Nuclear and Space Talks (START, INF, and Defense and Space, 1985-1991). General Detinov is presently a senior analyst in a scientific center of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a participant in the Russian-American joint Global Protection Program.