The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 triggered one of the gravest international crises since the Second World War. The fiftieth anniversary of the Suez crisis in 2006 presented an ideal opportunity to re-visit and reassess this seminal episode in post-war history. Although much has been written on Suez, this study provides fresh perspectives by reflecting the latest research from leading international authorities on the crisis and its aftermath. By drawing on recently released documents, by including previously neglected aspects of Suez, and by reassessing its more familiar ones, the volume makes a key contribution to furthering research on - and understanding of - the crisis. The volume explores the origins of the crisis, the crisis itself and the aftermath all from a broad perspective. An introduction by the editor presents the current state of the historiography and provides an overview of the debates surrounding the crisis, while the conclusion by Scott Lucas not merely draws the themes of the book together, but also explores the crisis in its regional and international context. Within the overall context of focussing on the international and military aspects of the crisis, it is an explicit intention to embody in the contributions the multifaceted nature of Suez. Although Britain, as in many ways the principal actor, is strongly represented, there are also highly original chapters on both the regional and international dimensions to the crisis, and crucially the interaction between the two. As well as exploring the role of the main protagonists, essays also deal with American, Jordanian and Turkish reactions to the invasion. The overall result is an innovative, thought-provoking, and wide-ranging reassessment of Suez and its aftermath, which at a time when the Middle East once again holds the world's attention, is particularly appropriate.

Table of Contents:
Introduction, Simon C. Smith; Chapter 1 Prelude to the Suez Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Dominance over the Suez Canal, 1869–1956, Steve Morewood; Chapter 2 Eden, Churchill and the Battle of the Canal Zone, 1951–1954, Michael T. Thornhill; Chapter 3 Britain and the Suez Crisis: The Abadan Dimension, Peter J. Beck; Chapter 4 Julian Amery and the Suez Operation, Sue Onslow; Chapter 5 Who to Fight in 1956, Egypt or Israel? Operation Musketeer versus Operation Cordage, Eric Grove; Chapter 6 French–Israeli Relations, 1950–1956: The Strategic Dimension, Zach Levey; Chapter 7 Supporting the Brave Young King: The Suez Crisis and Eisenhower's New Approach to Jordan, 1953–1958, Clea Lutz Bunch; Chapter 8 A Reluctant Partner of the US over Suez? Turkey and the Suez Crisis, Ay?egül Sever; Chapter 9 The 1956 Sinai War: A Watershed in the History of the Arab—Israeli Conflict, David Tal; Chapter 10 When Did Nasser Expect War? The Suez Nationalization and its Aftermath in Egypt, Laura M. James; Chapter 11 The Suez Crisis at the United Nations: The Effects for the Foreign Office and British Foreign Policy, Edward Johnson; Chapter 12 In Search of 'Some Big, Imaginative Plan': The Eisenhower Administration and American strategy in the Middle East after Suez, Richard V. Damms; Chapter 13 Telling Tales Out of School: Nutting, Eden and the Attempted Suppression of No End of a Lesson, Philip Murphy; Chapter 14 Post-Suez Consequences: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East from Eisenhower to Nixon, Tore T. Petersen; Chapter 15 Suez 1956 and the Moral Disarmament of the British Empire, A.J. Stockwell; conclusion Conclusion, Scott Lucas;