Examines the central ideas of Dharmakirti, one of the most important Indian Buddhist philosophers and their reception by Tibetan thinkers. Dreyfus examines the central ideas of Dharmakīrti, one of the most important Indian Buddhist philosophers, and their reception among Tibetan thinkers. During the golden age of ancient Indian civilization, Dharmakīrti articulated and defended Buddhist philosophical principles. He did so more systematically than anyone before his time (the seventh century CE) and was followed by a rich tradition of profound thinkers in India and Tibet. This work presents a detailed picture of this Buddhist tradition and its relevance to the history of human ideas. Its perspective is mostly philosophical, but it also uses historical considerations as they relate to the evolution of ideas.

Table of Contents:
Preface and Acknowledgments Technical Notes Introduction I. A Few Methodological Considerations Purpose and Content The Commentarial Style of Indian and Tibetan Philosophical Traditions Scholarly Context The Hermeneutical Significance of Comparison The Structure of the Work Introduction II. Dharmakirti's Tradition in India and Tibet The Epistemological Turn in Indian Philosophy The Place of Dharmakirti in Indian Buddhism Dharmakirti's Tradition in Tibet Foundation of the Sa-gya Scholastic Tradition A Conflict of Interpretations Sa-gya Commentators The Rise of the Ge-luk Tradition The Origin and Significance of Sectarian Divisions Book One. Ontology and Philosophy of Language Part I. Ontology Chapter 1 Ontology and Categories Indian Philosophy and the Pramana Method Epistemology and Ontological Commitments Indian Schools of Philosophy Nyaya Realism and the Importance of Categories The Meanings of Realism Nyaya Realism and the Status of Wholes Dharmakiti's Critique of Substance Chapter 2 Dharmakirti's Ontology Momentariness and the Structure of Dharmakirti's System Dharmakirti on Momentariness Causal Nature of Reality Dharmakirti's Ontology and Its Relation to the Problem of Universals Uncommoness and Identity Conditions Chapter 3 The Ambiguities of the Concept of Existence The Problems of Dharmakirti's Concepts of Existence Sa-pan's Controversial Views on Existence Defenses and Interpretations of Sa-pan Chapter 4 The Purview of the "Real" Atomic Theory An Alternate Interpretation No Extended Object Can Be Real Some Extended Objects Are Real Extension in Space and Time All Extended Objects Are Real Who Is Right? Yogacara in Dharmakirti's System Is Dharmakirti Contradicting Himself? Chapter 5 Ge-luk Thinkers on Specific Ontology Commonsense Objects and Universals Ge-luk Realism and Commonsense Objects Realism and Momentariness Philosophy and the Validity of Conventions Realist Explanations of the Nature of the Specifically Characterized Nominal Existence and Existence A Partial Reconciliation Conclusion Part II. The Problem Of Universals Chapter 6 Introducing Universals Three Dimensions in the Problem of Universals Antirealism and Its Varieties: Conceptualism and Nominalism Extreme and Moderate Realisms and Their Predicaments Realism in India Moderate Realism in Indian Traditions Why Bother with Universals? Chapter 7 Dharmakirti on Universals Logic and Ontology Dharmakirti's Arguments Against Realism The Roles of Universals Universals and Similarities An Assessment of Resemblance Theory Chapter 8 Sa-gya Antirealism and the Problems of Predication Sa-pan's Refutation of Realism Sakya Chok-den on Predication Predication and the Validity of Thought Are Distinguishers Parts of Reality? The Conceptual Nature of Individuations Chapter 9 Ge-luk Realism Universals in the Collected Topics One and Many Arguments for Moderate Realism Subject and Predicate Philosophy and Linguistic Ambiguities Chapter 10 Realism in Buddhist Tradition Two Early Tibetan Realists Moderate Realism in Tibet and Madhyamaka Moderate Realism in India The Role of Universals in Inference Conclusion Part III. Philosophy Of Language Chapter 11 Introduction to Apoha The History of Apoha and its Reception Grammar and Philosophy of Language in India Dignaga on Apoha Hindu Reactions: the Mimamsa View Chapter 12 Dharmakirti on Concept Formation Thought and Language Two Definitions of Thought The Negative Nature of Conceptuality Formation of Concept The Mistaken Nature of Concepts Conclusion: Dharmakirti's Response to the Hindu Critique Chapter 13 The Concept of Negation and the Evolution of the Apoha Theory Are Negation and Elimination Equivalent? Objective Elimination Santaraksita on Representations The Evolution of the Apoha Theory Ge-luk Views of Negations Sa-gya Views on Negations Chapter 14 Object Universal and Concept Formation Importance of the Notion of Object Universal in the Tibetan Tradition Object Universal in the Ge-luk Tradition Object Universal in the Sa-gya Tradition Comparative Conclusion Chapter 15 Philosophy of Language The Terminology of the Inquiry Ineffability Dharmakirti on Name and Reference Signifier and Signified A Sa-gya View Moderate Realism and Language Book Two. Epistemology Part I. Valid Cognition Chapter 16 Dharmakirti's Epistemology of Valid Cognition Mental Terminology and the Mind-Body Problem Knowledge and Pramana Defining Pramana The Epistemological Role of Language Epistemological Typology Chapter 17 Was Dharmakirti a Pragmatist? Valid Cognition and Its Object An Intentional Interpretation The Requirement of Novelty A Pragmatist Explanation of Nondeceptiveness A Pragmatic Theory of Truth? Reductionism and Intentionality Chapter 18 Can Inference Be Valid? Dharmakirti on the Validity of Thought A Major Difficulty in Dharmakirti's System A Realist Answer Conclusion Part II. Perception Chapter 19 Philosophy of Perception Representationalism and Its Problems Representationalism and Realism in Indian Philosophy Aspects and Reflexivity The Foundational Significance of Aspects Chapter 20 Dharmakirti's Account of Perception The Nyaya Theory of Perception Dharmakirti's Definition of Perception Dharmakirti's Arguments Chapter 21 A New Epistemology Begins: Dharmottara on Perception Dharmottara as a Commentator and an Innovator The Validity of Perception Bridging the Gap Between Perception and Conception Does Perception Determine Its Object? Chapter 22 Tibetan New Epistemology Cha-ba's Epistemology of Perception Ge-luk Views of Perception Implicit and Explicit Epistemological Typologies Chapter 23 Cha-ba's Philosophy of Mind Cha-ba's Typology of Objects Sakya Chok-den's Polemical Use of History Critical Appraisal Chapter 24 Sa-pan's Critique of the New Epistemology Sa-pan's Rejection of Cha-ba's Typology The Case of Inattentive Cognition Ascertainment Is Conceptual Explicit and Implicit Dharmakirti's Problem and Sa-pan's Solution Chapter 25 Perception and Apperception Dharmakirti on the Self Presencing of Mental States Does Self